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Rcnarks of Senato r Mike Mansfield 
·-t..J ~ ;?~t,~~ ~ ~· 
~cuJ:i DEFENSE Al\I J: sfcuRITY 
With the truce in Ko r ea and the inconcbsive reoults of the Berlin 
Conference, another chapter in the boo!t of history must be considered . The 
future of the United States of America dependo on the maintenance of a sound mili-
tary policy, keyed to C:1e d·;.ngers of the atomic age and at the san.e time tied to 
the economic and poli~:.cal harnework of ou:: ca;;>ita.Hstic syotcn1 . There is no 
chec:.p, no easy nor su:re sobtion to the difficdties which confront us in t!1is day 
and age. There is ::o r; :r.t;~e pos::.L::le W.:!~.pcn whid1 v:ill automatically win wars or 
by its very dest::-uct~•.reness preve"'lt them. The abe in whkh we live calls for 
clearer thinkin~, fG:.t.i'1g up to rec:.lit~es and sound decisions . This period calls for 
steadine<Js :no·:!' !o1·:;;:;n r·~licy ?r:<! co·~~:nui~y ~n o~'.i..' miHta.::-y stt·cngth. The age 
in which'""':: UVF. pc:~ £o1· ·. s tr..: .~::>sdb~1.ity that w::t:r·o may be recurrent and until 
a peace£a: a~d ::;e;:ul ·~ ·.,.;orl:i is achieved, we must, in my opinion, always operate 
on that assump~:on. 
I real.:.::.;: fl~~l ·.:e:~ ~· 'l.t ~~·e id~;:.:i sts ::.mor.g \..~ thi·.k that a better way of 
life can be ac:.icved :'.>~all p:;op~e ~o the end t1.a t w~:·s will be a'"'andoned forever . 
I wiGh that I could hold to t: ~s idec>.l. I p::c:.y that it can come true but as a matte r 
of practical ner.~.:ssi -~·. 1 c:.rn a~ra5~ that i.vng- sought· for day is b~yond the period 
of our immcd~a~e hi£"~::>ric<:~l .futur-e. !n i.he w~''1 our :respon:;ibilities, we can no 
longer afford to keep our tl\cH'd -- tha~ if; , Ot .. :• c!efe!.ses - - cown. As the leading 
nation among the fr ac coun:::-ies of the world, we mu•:;t assume the burden of 
leadership if the peoples in the arc;:. arc to r<>tain any degree of the freedom 
which they now enjoy . We c~nnot afford ups and downs in eithe:: our military or 
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foreign policy and we should recognize the fact these freedoms which we enjoy 
were paid for with our blood and our treasure. We must r ealize further that if 
we are to retain these freedoms, which too many of us accept complacently, that 
we must be prepared to pay and i! need be, to fight for their retention. 
In the present world there are two great powers behind which, to a 
greater or lesser degree, the rest of the world is aligned. Those powers as the 
world well knows are the United States of America and the Union of the Soviet 
SociaHs~ Republic. The tactical changes in Russian policy do not mean that we 
can afford to shore up our defenses, bring the boys home and lapse into a period 
which used to be called "normalcy". 
The Soviet's idea to bring Arne rica to its knees is two-fold; one, to 
weaken our economy to such an extent that we will have a depression at home. 
Two, to cause a split between our allies and ourselves, Honeyed words by the 
Soviets should not lull us into a sense of false security because unless these words 
are transformed into deeds, and until these deeds prove what they mean, there 
can be no let - up in the deep seated friction which exists between the free and 
slave world . Americans would be foolish to think that the skies above and the 
oceans on both sides furnish us with a really protective barrier. We know that 
we are very vulnerable and becoming more so each day as space - devouring, 
ocean-spanning aircraft and missiles, submarines that can cross the oceans sub-
me:-ged and atomic weapons are developed. The fact that other frontiers are 
vulnerable does not mean any less security for the vulnerability of our own outer 
life lines. The possibility of a seriously crippling attack against the shores of 
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the United States is something we must remember at all times and on that basis 
we must do all we can to bring about, if possible, awareness of the danger such 
an attack might inflate. 
According to our best informe<i scientists, we have about a three-year 
lead in the ato mic arms race in relation to the Sovi~t Union. We know there have 
been three atomic detonations in Russia. We know that the United States has 
detonated at least 44 A-weapons of all types from city-busters to atomic shells 
fired by cannon. In November, 1952 for the first time a hydrogen device blew an 
istc.nd off the map of the Pacific, created a tremendous crater in the bottom of 
the ocean of Sllfficient capacity to comfortably accommodate 14 Pentagon buildings, 
and released tl1e equivalent in power of more than five million tons of TNT as 
compared to the 15, 000 - 20, 000-ton bomb of Hiroshima and the 20, 000-ton bomb 
of Nagasaki. In World War II Ameri<:an Air Force planes all over the world 
dropped only two million tons of bombs; today 100 B-50 airplanes with one 
Nagasaki type bomb each would equal that amount. In other words, the hydrogen 
bomb is to the atomic bomb as the atomic bomb is to TNT. We are now definitely 
in the hydrogen age and all the armed services of the United States are now 
beginning to receive production versions of guided missiles and are also continu-
ing to develop still further the terrible German nerve gases, developed in World 
War 11, to even more toxic gases. This technological revolution in weapons has 
decre;:tsed, not inc:t"eased, our security and this factor shodd be fully unC.erstood 
by all of us. In practically every field of tech.1ological research in the weapons 
of de st2'uction, we mu·st assume, and I thin!< rightly so, that the Soviet Union is 
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moving along parallel paths. The Soviet Union today has, it has been estimated, 
a stockpile of between 100-175 atomic weapons. In the opinion of certain high 
ranking officials of the United States Air Force, she w::.ll have enough atomic 
weapons by mid- 1954 to sustain an atomic offensive against the United States and 
our allies and the planes to carry the bombs. Our atomic advan!age in quantity 
and qua!ity of weapons will not be of much comfort to us if and when such a time 
comes, but neither will it be too much of an advantc.ge to an aggressor because 
the aggressor knows that the retaliation ·.<~ill be terrible and in k~nd. 
In the matter of hyC.rogen bombs, we might just z.s well face up to the 
fact that the Russians have their scientists working on the problem and that its 
development will be somewhat parallel to ours . In addition, it is reasonable to 
assume that both the Soviet Union and the free world are working on what is known 
as the "cobalt" bomb. This advance over the hydrogen missile could be made by 
"seeding" atom and hydrogen bombs with cobalt. I understand the resulting 
radiation would be so deadly that it would destroy friend and foe alike. V'e can 
see therefore that Russia in the final analysis is not get~ing weaker but is, in fact, 
getting stronger all the time . Their tactics .. 1ay be changed temporarily but not 
tl1ei:- st.:ategy. Their ultimate goal is still the same, sec•uity for the Soviet 
Union and _world conquest. These two objectives can and should be viewed as 
mutually supporting and identical. 
Turning to the economy of our country we can see that even here we are 
entering a period of danger. In the past few years the United St=-.tes has changed 
from "!1.ave" to a "have not" nation. For the first time in our history, we are 
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importing more than 50o/o of our raw materi,;.ls from sources outside of our own 
frontiers. This fact should be borne in mind for a better understanding of the 
foreign policy of the United States and which should bring home to all of us the 
continuing need which we will have on other nations as sources of supply for 
these raw strategic materials. The present administration has, and I believe 
rightly, abandoned the "crisis year" philosophy of the previous administration 
and prepared, instead, not for any definite date of danger but for an indefinite 
continuation of danger. 
Because of the reasons enumerated, we should recognize that we face 
far greater difficulties in the future than we have in the past. We have strength 
today and that strength must be maintained. We are fa!" better prepared at this 
moment than we were prio r to any of the wars in which this country has been 
engaged. Our Navy is the strongest in the world. !t is large r than all the rest 
of the world's fleets put together even though 50 of its ships are to be put in 
mothballs under the "new look". We are operating a total of 25-30 aircraft 
carriers of all types and we maintain - for the time being at least - an 
amphibious lift in commission for two divisions. We arc fairly well-prepared 
against any threat by submarine. Of the some 400 Soviet submarines possibly 
ten arc of the modern snorkel long-range type; another 75-100 are conventional 
ocean- going types; all the rest are small coastal submarines or old medium-
range vessels. The United States has m ore long-range ocean-going submarines 
than the Russians and our defenses against snbmarinc attacks are by no means 
weak. 
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On the question of air power, we are not weaker in number though we 
may be behind tempora:-ily in the number of modern tactical types. The Navy 
and the Marine Corps has an inventory of about 13, OvO planes of all military 
types (including t::ainers); the Air Force has about 21, 000 which, under fiscal 
1955 budget plans will be increased to 22 , 000 by mid-!955 . We are stronger 
than the Soviet Union in long-range land-based bombers and in naval plar.es both 
car:-ier-based and patrol-type. The Soviets have greater strength than we do in 
land- based tactical types for support of ground armies, intcrcepti.on, and day-
fighter missions. 
The Air Force has activated more than 100 groups -- numbering from 
30 to 75 planes each -- but probably no more than 85 of these groups are fully 
ope:-ation:'ll at this time . Our air power is in transition from propeller-driven, 
slow- speed types to jet - powered transonic and supcrsor.ic types with only one-
fot:.rth of current Air Force flying time in jets. In the latter field the Russians 
appear at the momet'lt to be at least equal to, possibly superior to us. 
The aircraft production of the two counti·ics is probably about the same 
with the yearly outcome averaging between 12, 000 - 14, 000 military types. One 
difference though, and it is an important one, is that we arc producing more 
planes in terms of air frame weight which means more of our outp:.1t rep:::esents 
heavy complicated jet bombers. Our greatest apparent disadvantage is on land. 
The Marines have 3 divisions and the Army mair.tains 20 divisions plus 18 regi -
mental combat teams. Of the Army divisions, six - with two being recalled 
and one Marine division are in Korea; two , plus one Marine division, are in 
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Japan; five in Europe; seven in the United States -- plus numerous regimental 
combat teams and other smaller units here and abroad. Cf the seven divisions 
in the United States, six are weak -- below strength -- and none ready for combat 
except the 82d Airborne Division. 
The Russian'S on the other hand maintain a b~sic framewor!< of 175 
divisions though most of them are not at full strength. On the basis of combat 
effectiveness, which includes mobility, fire power, etc., it is estimated that the 
175 Russian divisions wodd approximately equal no more than 70 - 90 American-
type divisions. The Soviet1s advantage of land power is very great, particularly 
since the Rusaians could mobilize from 100 - 300 additional divisions in 90 cays, 
whereas the United States r eserve strength is in no sense organized, trained, or 
equipped f,n combat without a long preparatory period after war starta. Further-
more , although the str ength of the Soviet Army is practically the same as it was 
at the end of World War II -- 175 divisions, numbering approximately 4 million 
-- the fact is that almost all the Soviet divisions have been thoroughly modernized, 
mechanized and brought up to date. Cn the basis of what I have said, it is 
appa!'ent that at the moment the Soviet UnioP has a greater advantage on land. 
This, therefore, must be compensated for by a continuing American advantage 
in the ai::- and at sea -- an adv~ntage which we hold today and wHch we m•.1st, in 
my opinion, accelerate to a greater Jegree in the air. Cur air strength is not 
sufficient to win air superiority over Western Europe or Northeast Asia. We 
are fortunate though in having s ome highly inJustrialized nations among our 
allies in NATO, allies actually of potential strength in air power whe r eas in 
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contrast , the captive countri<-s behind the Iron Curtain are chiefly dependent on 
Soviet factories for their aircraft and equipment. British desinn is abreast, or, 
in some respects, ahead of the world, partict:larly in fighter types and .in meuium 
or short- range jet bombers. Though British air power is weak qua:1titatively 
toc,.y and dependent chiefly upon U.S. F-86 jet ficrhtcrs and U.S. B-29 bombers , 
the future qualitative picture is bright. Thus to ou.c 0\'10 strength in Europe 
must be added the strength of NATO . Despite what some people in this country 
say, NATO is a great asset to the free world and the industrial output of Western 
Europe , particularly, that of the Ruhr is tremcndo~.:.sly important. The divisions, 
fleets and air for~cs of the thirteen cour.tries in the NATO alliance, are not to be 
taken lighlly . Excli!Sive of five United States divisions, the original NA TC today 
can put into the field 49 divisions in Western Europe plus 10 small ones in Greece; 
22 large ones in Turkey and 33 in Yugoslavia. This compares favorably with 
eastern European satellite strength of approximately 80 divisions . Our allies 
also ope::ate over 4, 000 aircraft and more than 1, 000 antisubmarine and coastal 
naval vessels . In cont r ast in the Pacific there are now 20 South I<orean divisions . 
There are now the beginning of six armed divisions in Japan; Chiang Kai - shek has 
21 divisions on Formosa and in Indo - China the French have- the eqdvalent to ten 
divisions and in Malaya the British have 2 .. 3. There are other units all over 
Asia and the Pacific but even here the back-bone of strength is America . Cn the 
othe::- hand, the Chinese Communist Army is estimated at 4 millio:1. In addit:on 
in other Asiatic countries there are f::.rther forces of guerrillas who at·e supported 
and kept in the fight by supplies from Soviet Russia and Eastern Euro?C. 
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This, then, is where we stand today -- considerably better off, in a 
military sense, than where we stood two and a half years ago. but by no means 
secure. In some ways we have gained by time; in some ways we have lost. We 
arc stronger in conventional arms vis-a-vis Soviet P.ussia than we were, and we 
have probably gained relatively in atomic w apons. t!'lough this relative gain 
cannot continue. 
Western Europe is no longe:::- defenseless; the days of r. Russian 
blitzkrieg and pushover are gone . Yugoslavia has th:-own her lot in with the West 
in Europe. Our strength is now sufficier.t to force Russian re-enforcement and 
thus to give us warning of any attack. 
VIe are no longer in the dire danger in Korea that we were in 1950; and 
the French -- faced in 1950 with the loss of the whole Red River valley in Indo-
China -- certainly are hetter off today, l>aving gained some ad•tantages in the war 
of attrition in the past two years. In the Philippines, Malaya, and Burma, the 
Communist armed struggle has definitely lost st£"ength. 
Cur :-eady military strength is considerable, and our trel'l"endous 
military potential can be far more quickly realized than two years ago. 
But to offset these gains is the fact that Communist China has hcen 
strengthened, rather than weakened. by the Korean war. This va:>t Asiatic power 
seems to be more solidly under control of its totalitaria.n leadership than it was 
three years ago, and certainly it has made amazing strides in the development 
of modern milita1·y power - - particularly in the air {there are now 2, 500 to 3. 000 
Ch~.ne3e planes, furnished by Russia). Thus the Chinese Red Army' s weakr..esses 
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in air power, antiaircraft, artillery, co nmunications, and mobility of suppl y 
have been to a large extent (though not, of course , completely) remedied, and we 
may be witnessing in the Orient a historic phenomenon of tremendous impo rtance 
to our time -- the emergence of China from feudali~m into a modern stale. 
There is another debit in the balance sheet, caused (but only partially) 
by the frustration of Korea. It is a lack of drive and a declining sense of urgency 
-- a sometimes apathetic morale - - and the national frictions and differences 
that weaken the anti-Communist coalition. 
Where, then , do we go from here -- with crisis not ended but 
compounded? 
At this time a p r ecise answer is no t possible. The first Eisenhower 
defense and fo r e i gn aid budget was undoubtedly indicative of a t:rend to "stretch 
out" and "cut ba c!<" , and yet to maintain a strong military posture. But no firm 
idea of where we are going -- o r how fast -- was possible until: (a) the four new 
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had "shaken down" in their duties and 
functioned as a team; (b) a complete r eview of strategic plans and levels of armed 
strength has been made by the new Chiefs of Staff; (c ) the Eisenhower defense 
budget for the 1955 fiscal year has been p r epared; and (d) there is fu r ther develop-
ment of the meaning of r ecent internal events in Russia and clari:icaticn of the 
Communists• "peace" gestures . In this connection , the Joint Chiefs have come 
up with a "new l ook" which no one, as yet, fully understands except that it 
increases air power, places majo r r eliance un the Strategic Air Command -- the 
"massive r etaliatory power" aspect -- and ~educes the present str ength of the 
Army, Navy, and Marine Corps . 
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There is, however, no doubt that Congress and much of the Republican 
Party are in an economy mood; that the form of economic isolationism which 
expresses itself in high tariff barriers and in sharp reductions in foreign aid is 
gaining strength; and that, while air power still has a great poHtical and popular 
appeal, many Congressmen believe there is much waste and "fat" in the defense 
budg<:t. TJt,less the world crisis sharpens, the armed services and especially 
the foreign airl program are certainly in for a period of collar retrenchment. 
The 1954 defense budget, prep~red by the T::-uman Adm~nist::.'ation but 
hastily revised by Secretary of Defense Wilson and President Eisenhower, 
sbcwed the trend clearly. Expenditures during the next fiscal year will not be 
greatly reduced because of prior contracts and a balance on the books of billions 
of dollars o f authorized funds which have not yet been obligated or spent. 
However, a deep cut of more than $5 billion was applied to the Truman 
armed forces appropriation request fo r fiscal 1954 and the Eisenhower budget for 
1955. Such C:J.ts wi!l result in an actual reduction of existing operating units; it 
will not cut, this year, into bone or muscle or sinew; but it will mean a reduction 
in deliveries of aircraft and other items in future years. Furthermore , it almost 
ce!"tainly implies abandonment of the 143-group program of the Air Force . 
The immediate results are that the services will be reduced t~is year 
bo~h in numbers of men in uniform and in numbers of civilian employees; that 
some orders for new equipment will not be placed; and also that som~ existing 
orders will be either cancelied, cut ~ack, or str~tched out . 
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The long-term effects are more important. The cut scer.1s to mean 
that the expansion and growth of the a r med forces -- though not their m oderniza-
tion -- is to be halted oelow present levels and under the "platc::.u of str ength' ' 
which had been the gcal of the T r aman Administr atbn . 
The Truman expansion progt'am, hast:.ly invoked after the Korean war, 
had as its goals an Army of 21 active divisions (plus 18 rcaimcntal combat teams, 
etc.), a Navy of mor e than l, 200 active ope ·ating vessels and some 15, 000 
modern aircraft (including Marine ail·c~aft), a Marine Corps of 3 <!ivisions and 
3 air wings, an<! an Ai:.- For-.e of 143 groups, most of them equipped with modern 
postwar aircraft to a total of about 21, 00:) planes. The target date for these goals 
was originally mid-1954; this was stretched out under President Truman to 
1955-56. 
When President Eisenhower took office, the Army was shy only one of 
its 21 divi!iions, though many of its units were incomplete; and the Navy was on 
the whole in good shape , ti10ugh it badly neede<! new jets for its carriers and a 
program of shipbuilding and ship conversion. Thus the Army and Navy had almos 
reached the l evels of their numerical expansion, though their corresponding 
modernization p r ogram was but half completed. 
The Air Fo rce, however, had reached only 110 groups on its way to the 
143-group ~;oal , although Secr etary of Defense \\Tilson stated in Indianapolis, on 
December 7, 1953 , that h e will ask Congress in fiscal year 1955 for funds to build 
toward a 137- g•·oup Air Force by mid- 1956 o:.- 1957. M0reover, only about 85 
of th~se were fully operational, and thci'e was s~ill a high percentage of 
obsolescent World War II type aircraft. 
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In sum, the new t>--0 ~,.am scE>.-r.s to mean -- subject to the qualifying 
factors previously mentioned -- tl=t the A-rmy will stabilize at a strer:gth of 18 
divisions (many under strength}; the Kavy will ~e reduced somewhat in size; and 
the Air Force will stabilize at something like 137 groups. 
Also, the new "plateau of strength" -- lowet' than the old - - will 
probably be reached !insofar as complete modernization of the services is con-
cerned} somewhat late r than the p:!:evious 1955- 56 deadline. 
The revised goals , plus the slowdo· ;n in the NATO prog:-:e.m, may 
ult~mately result in somewhat greater combat effectiveness of the active units 
even though t!le total strength will be less. On balance, the calculated military 
risk has been somewhat increased, for there has been no change in 011r estimate 
of Russian military capabilities save the obvious struggle for power now going on 
in the Kremlin . 
* * * * * * * 
* * >'.< 
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